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Article 13

HEALTHCARE INSURANCE,
AIDS AND THE ADA
CATHERINE HANSSENS*

The HIV infection is a covered disability under the Americans
2
with Disabilities Act ("ADA").' In Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C.,
an attorney sued his former employer, a law firm, for termination
based on the belief that he had HIV. 3 In Doe, the district court was
quick to distinguish the assertion by the defendants that HIV was
not a disability. Instead, the Court concluded that HIV is a substantial impairment of an important life function and thus, a disability as defined under the ADA, because HIV places a limitation
on the ability to reproduce.4
In the late 1980s, Jack McGann, who worked for six years with
H & H Music Company, had an employee health benefits plan (the
"Plan") as part of his employment package. 5 After he was diagnosed with HIV and filed benefit claims, however, he learned that
his employer changed the terms of the Plan, which previously had
a million dollar lifetime benefits cap for each Plan participant.
Subsequent to McGann filing his claims, the the Plan was altered
to a $5,000 cap on benefits only for persons with AIDS.6 Needless
to say, McGann quickly exhausted the new limit. These events
occurred prior to the enactment of the ADA. Lawyers for McGann,
including the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
("Lambda"), argued that the Employee Retirement Income Secur* Director of the AIDS Project for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Founder and coordinator of the Hunderton County Pro-Choice Network in New Jersey.
B.S., Temple University, 1974; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, 1983.
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (codified at 42 U.S.C., §§ 12101-213 (Supp. V
1993)) [hereinafter ADA].
2 866 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
3 Id. at 193.
4 Id. at 196.
5 See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F. Supp. 392, 393 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946
F.2d. 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct.
482 (1992).
6 McGann, 742 F. Supp. at 393 (recognizing that defendants, in making changes to its
health care insurance, including medical coverage, also changed to self-insurance from
fully-insured plan previously provided by employer's insurance company).
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ity Act ("ERISA") 7 prohibits discrimination resulting from alteration of significant health care benefits after the submission of
claims.8 In particular, Lambda pointed out that section 510 of ERISA appears to expressly prohibit discrimination that is intended
to deprive a plan participant of plan benefits granted to such participant from the inception of his employment made as part of the
employment bargain.9
The federal district court for the Southern District of Texas disagreed with these arguments by the plaintiff and in 1991 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision."0 The Court of Appeals held that the insurer and the employer had the right to unilaterally change the
terms of the plan at any time and that this was not the kind of
discrimination that ERISA was intended to eliminate.'1
Upon petition of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
the Solicitor General argued that the Fifth Circuit decision was
correct. The government asserted that even though the court's position seems inequitable, a recently enacted law, the American's
With Disabilities Act, 2 will remedy this type of employee benefits
discrimination. Therefore, according to the federal government,
we should not concern ourselves with what the Fifth Circuit and
other courts have decided is the scope of ERISA protection against
discrimination.' 3 In essence, the government was arguing that
there were other protections forthcoming, which will protect per7 See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994) (stating that it is unlawful for any person to interfere with
protected rights under ERISA).
8 See McGann, 742 F. Supp. at 393-94 (maintaining that ultimate purpose of ERISA is to
prevent discrimanatory changes from occurring in employer group medical plans).
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994); McGann v. H & H Music Company, 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th
Cir. 1991) (concluding that section 510 of ERISA will deem discrimination illegal "only if it
is motivated by a desire to retaliate against an employer or to deprive an employee of an

existing right to which he may become entitled").

10 McGann, 946 F.2d at 405-06, 408 (holding that employer election not to cover or continue to cover AIDS is not "discrimination" as defined under ERISA).
11 Id. at 408. The Court stated that under ERISA, "the asserted discrimination is illegal

only if it is motivated by a desire to retaliate against an employee or to deprive an employee
of an existing right to which he may become entitled." Id.
12 ADA, supra note 1.

13 See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 400 (11th Cir. 1993). The Owens
court adopted an almost identical position as the Fifth Circuit in McGann. But see, Wheeler
v. Dynamic Engineering, 850 F. Supp. 459, 467 (E.D. Va. 1994), aff'd. 62 F.3d 634 (4th Cir.

1995). The Wheeler court distinguished itself from the 5th and 11th circuits and agreed
with the 3rd Circuit. See Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41, 42-43 (3rd Cir.
1991) (holding that employer cannot modify its health plan retroactively to exclude coverage for treatment that has already begun); see also Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc.,
850 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 62 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 1995).
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sons with disabilities from disparate treatment by private employ14
ers, regardless of Mr. McGann's current dilemma.
Certainly health care insurance is a significant issue under the
employment provisions of the ADA, particularly since employment
health benefit plans are the principal source of financing medical
treatment for people under the age of 65.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled persons also
in regard to employee compensation and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment. 5 The ADA makes it unlawful for
an employer to limit, segregate, or classify an employee in a manner that adversely affects their employment opportunities or
status on the basis of disability.' 6 The legislative history of section
12112(b)(1) of the ADA indicates that it was intended to apply to
employer-provided health care insurance.' 7 Finally, the ADA
defines the term "discriminate" as participation in a discriminatory contractual or other type of arrangement by an employment
agency, a labor union or an organization providing fringe
benefits.' 8
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC")
has promulgated regulations for guidance of its staff in an attempt
to set out the interplay between the ADA non-discrimination mandates of Title I and the ADA Title V insurance provisions. To reconcile the two, the EEOC has relied on Congressional Committee
reports reflecting the ADA's purposes.' 9 Clearly, if the plans are
insured, as opposed to self-funded plans, they must also comply
with the anti-discrimination provisions of any relevant state insurance laws.2 °
14 See Owens, 984 F.2d at 400. (stating that absent evidence of retaliation or interference
with attainment of entitled rights under plan, ERISA provides no right to perpetual health

benefits with immutable terms).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993).
16 Id. § 12112(b)(1).
17 See H.R. REP. No. 48511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 336-37 [hereinafter ADA Legislative History] (noting that legislation
prohibits discrimination against any qualified individual with disability, including limitations on fringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by
covered entity).
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
19 See generally Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
ADA, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1994) [hereinafter EEOC Regulations].
20 ADA Legislative History, supra note 17, at 416 (describing purpose of § 12112(b)(2) is
to permit development and administration of benefit plans in accordance with accepted
principles of risk assessment).

570

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 10:567

Based on EEOC regulations, the ADA permits a plan to classify
or administer risks as well as limit the types of coverage based on
actuarial risk, provided a given risk classification is not used as a
subterfuge for discrimination. 2 1 The EEOC traditionally has defined subterfuge as, a disability based on a distinction which cannot be cost justified.2 2
In other words, the ADA legislation and the EEOC regulations
require that an individual with a disability have equal access to
all health care coverage under a given plan provided to those without disabilities. To determine compliance, the disparate treatment test, rather than the disparate impact test, is employed.
Therefore, it would appear that under the ADA, even though an
exclusion of certain types of treatments, such as x-rays, may have
a greater impact on some persons with disabilities than others, it
is not prohibited under the ADA's prohibition on discrimination
regarding the terms of the benefit plan provided.23
On the other hand, if an employer-provided benefit plan excluded AZT treatment, which almost exclusively is associated with
the treatment of HIV, then the EEOC would consider this the kind
of disability based discrimination that the ADA prohibits.2 4 Taken
together, this permits the employer [or insurance company?] to
deny coverage to an individual for certain types of treatment provided it is not clearly an attempt to deny coverage on the basis of a
disability diagnosis. However, singling out a particular disease
rather than a particular type of treatment will not be tolerated
under the ADA.
More recently, cases that Lambda is involved with, on the amicus level, examine: (1) the extent to which the ADA is being applied to self-funded plans that have evaded protection and regulation under ERISA, and; (2) the definition of an employer under the
ADA.
21 See EEOC Regulations, supra note 19 (noting that practices permitted by § 12112(b)
should not violate any EEOC regulations even if they result in limitations on individuals
with disabilities provided that these activities are not used as subterfuge to evade purposes
of ADA).
22 Id. (stating that whether or not activities are being used as subterfuge is to be determined without regard to date insurance plan or employee benefit plan was adopted).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that acceptable voluntary medical examinations as part of employee health program and acceptable inquiries by covered
entity are related to job-related functions).
24 See T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Utah 1993) (holding that state statute
prohibiting and voiding marriage by persons with AIDS is violative of ADA and Rehabilitation Act of 1973); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993).
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In conclusion, the ADA is not going to bankrupt the private insurance system. Instead, it requires the employer to treat all its
employees equitably. Those attorneys who have represented people with HIV for years welcome the kind of protection that the
ADA will provide to people living with HIV and AIDS. The protections of the ADA against discrimination applies to persons with
AIDS and also to those perceived to have HIV. Both categories
predominantly have been gay men. In the past, such discrimination has resulted in limited or no access to benefits in the work
place which traditionally have been afforded to other workers.
Hopefully, the ADA will place such employees on an equal footing.

